






This paper develops a general equilibrium model based on a set of small open economy
assumptions and derives an expression for equilibrium inﬂation. A standard argument is
that inﬂation is decreasing in openness because openness alters the slope of the Phillips
curve. But openness also aﬀects the monetary authority’s utility function, and this
introduces an ambiguity. Inﬂation may rise and fall as the economy becomes more open
because foreign demand for domestic production and openness interact, altering the
incentives of the monetary authority.
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11 Introduction
Mundell-Fleming extensions of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model suggest there is an in-
verse relationship between openness and inﬂation. In these models expansionary monetary
policy causes both an increase in domestic output and a deterioration in the terms of trade.
As openness changes, the incentives the (discretionary) monetary policy maker faces change
because openness alters the slope of the Phillips curve and the eﬀe c to fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yo n
output. As the degree of openness rises the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ becomes less favourable
and optimal policy is less expansionary. This mechanism generates an inverse relationship
between openness and inﬂation.1 Although the argument is persuasive it is common to as-
sume the monetary authority’s policy decision is based on a directly postulated loss function.2
A natural question is whether a similar openness-inﬂation relationship holds when households
and the monetary authority optimise over a set of well deﬁned preferences. Consistent with
recent work I use an optimising model incorporating nominal rigidities to study this question
where monetary policy decisions are based on a utility function.
An important part of determining the equilibrium level of inﬂation (and therefore it’s relation
to openness) are the costs and beneﬁts of expansionary monetary policy. King and Wolman
(2003) and Woodford (2003) both assume a staggered pricing structure so that the costs of
expansionary policy are welfare losses associated with relative price distortions across goods.
This approach has also been used by Clarida et al. (2002) in a two country model looking
at policy co-ordination. Albanesi et al. (2002) take a diﬀerent approach measuring the cost
of expansionary policy through distortions in money demand associated with movements in
the nominal interest rate when consumers have access to cash and credit goods. They adopt
Svensson’s (1985) timing change for cash goods so that households only have access to the
beginning of period level of real balances. To simplify the exposition here I take advantage
of this second approach using the beginning of period deﬁnition of real balances in the utility
1Empirical investigations based on this idea have been carried out by Romer (1993), Lane (1997) and
Temple (2002).
2One theoretical example of the ad-hoc approach is Rogoﬀ (1985).
2function implying that households make their money holding decision before their production
and consumption decisions.3 This simpliﬁcation is made for two reasons. First, it allows the
derivation of an explicit expression for equilibrium inﬂation without linear approximations.
Second, the beginning of period assumption helps capture the type of results found in the
ad-hoc literature allowing for some interesting comparisons. The beneﬁts of expansionary
policy in the model occur through increases in an ineﬃciently low level of output. This is
modelled by assuming a monopolistic supply of labour and preset money wage.
Monetary policy here is the choice of the entire sequence of money growth rates, which under
discretion may be re-set each period.4 Together with the beginning of period assumption this
implies the policy choice is characterised by a trade-oﬀ between increasing domestic output
and reducing consumers holdings of real balances. The beginning of period assumption works
because if prices rise, current real balances fall, and this leads to reduced purchasing power and
a loss in welfare. As the supply of money determines the consumer price index and households
have access to domestic and foreign produced goods openness aﬀects the monetary authority’s
utility function directly. As ﬁrms are concerned with the GDP deﬂator when demanding
labour services openness also aﬀects the Phillips curve giving rise to the standard terms of
trade eﬀect emphasised in previous studies. The policy trade-oﬀ is therefore subject to two
inﬂuences. Despite this it is still possible to identify how openness alters the equilibrium level
of inﬂation.
The model shows how equilibrium inﬂation is a function of consumption and real money bal-
ances and that the eﬀects of openness operate through both arguments. The more familiar
channel, based around the Phillips curve, is associated with the real money balances argu-
ment. The second channel works through the utility function of the monetary authority and
3As Nicolini (1998) emphasises the beginning of period speciﬁcation is entirely consistent with the worker-
shopper argument used to motivate both CIA and MIU models. The speciﬁcation used here can also be
thought of as implying a precautionary demand for money.
4This is somewhat diﬀerent to specifying monetary policy as the choice of the nominal interest rate, although
the equilibrium concept used has a similar interpretation. See Clarida et al. (1999) for a closed economy model
and Clarida et al. (2001) who consider a small open economy.
3is associated with the consumption argument. Openness has an unambiguous relationship
with equilibrium real balances, as do real balances with inﬂation. Therefore, holding con-
sumption constant, openness and inﬂation have the standard inverse relationship. However,
consumption depends on foreign demand and diﬀerent levels of foreign demand are associated
with changes in the equilibrium terms of trade. An increase in foreign demand therefore
creates a larger incentive for the monetary authority to inﬂate. This incentive disappears
when the economy is closed so that if foreign demand is suﬃciently high when the economy
is open equilibrium inﬂation may fall as the economy becomes more closed. Openness has an
inverse relationship with inﬂation when foreign demand is ‘low’ but when foreign demand is
‘high’ the standard openness-inﬂation result is overturned, inﬂation may rise and fall as the
country becomes more open.
The remainder of paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the model. Section
three solves the model for an arbitrary rate of money growth. Consistent with the arbitrary
policy choice the Phillips curve and consumption-output relations which act as constraints
on policy making decisions are derived in section four. Section ﬁve computes the (Markov)
equilibrium level of inﬂation when the monetary authority and households play a one shot
game and looks in detail at the relationship between openness and inﬂation. Section six
concludes.
2 The Model
The structure of the model is closely related to a number of recent two country macro mod-
els that assume optimising agents, nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. Both
economies (domestic and foreign) consist of a continuum of j ∈ [0,1] households which supply
ad i ﬀerentiated labour type. Households hold real money balances, nominal bonds and con-
sume domestic and foreign goods. The consumption and price level of domestically produced
goods are denoted with h-subscripts, and foreign economy equivalents with f. Foreign econ-
omy variables are denoted with asterisks. Firms choose amongst labour types and produce
4a single good and a monetary authority controls the supply of money by making lump-sum
transfers directly to households. The foreign economy is assumed to be in a zero inﬂationary
steady state and is large relative to the domestic economy. This implies the domestic econ-
omy takes conditions in the foreign economy as given and domestic exports form a negligible
component of the foreign economy’s consumption basket.
In period t ﬁrms make a production decision choosing labour, lj,t. Nominal wages, wj,t,
are preset one period in advance so labour is demand determined. Households choose the
sequences {Cj,t,M j,t+1,l j,t}
∞
t=0 to maximise Uj =
P∞
t=0 β
t(Cj,t,m j,t,l j,t),w h e r emj,t ≡ Mj,t/Pt
is the beginning of period deﬁnition of real money balances and Cj,t is consumption.5 The
monetary authority makes a lump-sum nominal money transfer ϑt = Mt(µt − 1)/µt to each
household, and dropping j subscripts nominal money holdings at the beginning of period t
obey,
Mt+1 = Mt/µt,( 1 )
where µt is the current period inverse money growth rate.6 Changing the MIUF argument in
this way and introducing monopolistic competition with a nominal rigidity has two eﬀects. If
the lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority is larger than expected, higher inﬂation
reduces purchasing power, whilst with a ﬁxed nominal wage an increase in prices leads to
increased output levels as labour is demand determined. When money is transferred there is
at r a d e - o ﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of surprise inﬂation which may change as openness
changes because the households consume both domestic and foreign goods.














5This is diﬀerent to the speciﬁcation in Calstrom and Fuerst (2001).
6The domestic monetary authority does not issue bonds.
5Bt + Mt+1 + PtCt = it−1Bt−1 + Mt + wtlt − ϑt + ϕt,( 3 )
where Bt are one period nominal bonds which pay gross interest it > 1, ϕt are monopoly
proﬁts and β,ν ∈ (0,1),a,η > 0, and κ>1 are parameters. Households consume a com-
posite of domestic and foreign produced goods and the CPI which is deﬁned from households
intratemporal consumption problem deﬂates nominal balances. For simplicity Cobb-Douglas






where n ∈ [0,1], and the implied price index is Pt ≡ Pn
h,tP
1−n
f,t . Similar preferences are
assumed in the foreign economy, but to formally model the small open economy assumption
n∗ → 0, and therefore P∗
t → P∗
f,t,w h e r eP∗
t is the foreign CPI.7 The parameter n is taken
as the measure of the domestic economy’s openness, where as n falls the domestic economy is
more open. For each good the law of one price holds so, Pa,t = stP∗
a,t for a = h,f,w h e r est
is the nominal exchange rate. The CPI now links the real and nominal exchange rates.
qt = st/Pt,( 5 )
where qt is the real exchange rate.8 Finally an arbitrage condition relates the domestic




t = st+1/st, (6)
where i∗
t is the foreign interest rate.
Firms use diﬀerentiated labour types to produce a single good. The production process is





f,t is completely exogenous.
8Given these deﬁnitions qt =( Pf,t/Ph,t)










with σ,α > 1, which represent the input substitution elasticity of labour types and the returns
to scale of the labour input respectively.
Two more conditions are required to describe the domestic economy. The resource constraint
is,




h,t is aggregate consumption of the domestic good in the foreign economy, and the
national budget constraint,
Bt = Ph,tyh,t − PtCt + it−1Bt−1,( 9 )
such that the end of period bond level is equal to domestic output minus the rate of absorption
plus interest from claims on foreign bonds.
3M o d e l S o l u t i o n
To ﬁnd the conditions under which markets clear I solve for the nominal exchange rate and
current account assuming an arbitrary rate of money growth, µt. The solution to the ﬁrms
problem maximises nominal proﬁts subject to the production constraint, (7). Taking the
ﬁrms problem in two stages cost minimisation implies conditional labour demand is lj,t =
(wj,t/wt)
−σ yα





.P r o ﬁt maximisation
subject to this constraint implies ﬁnal labour demand depends on the domestic price level and
technology,
yh,t =( αwt/Ph,t)
1/(1−α) .( 1 0 )
7The solution to the households problem maximises utility (3), subject to conditional labour
demand, the period budget constraint (2) and a no-ponzi game condition. The optimal
conditions for the household are,
wt = σηPtCt/(σ − 1)l
1−κ
t (11)
Pt+1Ct+1 = PtCtβit (12)
m
1/ν
t+1 = aCt/(it − 1). (13)
Equation (11) determines labour supply, (12) is the consumption Euler equation and (13)
expresses money demand. This speciﬁcation of preferences implies that the domestic nominal
interest rate depends on the domestic real interest rate. The assumption that beginning of
period balances enter the utility function now plays an important role because under this
timing assumption the period t+1real interest rate aﬀects the period t nominal interest rate.
Thus solving for the current level of the nominal interest rate only requires the determination
of rt+1.
As agents can only be surprised in the initial period, markets clear in all future periods and
for periods t ≥ 1 the monopolistic supply of labour equals the demand for labour. From (10)





t /(σ − 1)
´1/(1−κα)
∀t ≥ 1.( 1 4 )
The second condition that describes the real side of the economy is the goods market equilib-
rium relation. This is derived by combining the resource constraint (8), the price index and
the demand conditions, C∗
h,t = g∗st/Ph,t and Ch,t = nPtCt/Ph,t,w h e r eg∗ = n∗C∗ if g∗
t = g∗
∀t.9 As the price ratio is related to the real exchange rate uniquely,
9Whilst n∗ → 0, P∗C∗ is large, and from the assumptions P∗ =1 .
8yh,t = nq
(1−n)/n
t Ct + g
∗q
1/n
t ∀t,( 1 5 )
w h e r ea ni n c r e a s ei ng∗ can be viewed as an exogenous increase in foreign demand.10 These
two equations form an implicit good-supply system for yh,t,q t, and Ct which for periods t ≥ 1
is self-contained implying the real interest rate is at it’s steady state value, rt =1 /β ∀t ≥ 1.11
Given rt+1 =1 /β then Ct+1 = C and so it is possible to solve for the monetary sector by
transforming (13) into a diﬀerence equation involving real money balances by multiplying








mt+2,( 1 6 )
where µt+1 = Mt+1/Mt+2.A s mt+1 is non-predetermined when money growth is constant
at µ a saddle path condition holds so that real balances jump to their steady state value for
periods t ≥ 1. Going back to (13) it is apparent that the timing of private agents decisions
over money balances simpliﬁes the interaction between the real and monetary sectors relative
to a model with the end of period balances speciﬁcation and that the interest rate dynamics
are trivial.12
Remark 1 Following a permanent money shock the nominal interest rate jumps immediately
to it’s steady state value, it =1 /βµ ∀t.
The ﬁxed money wage in period t does not aﬀect the behaviour of the nominal interest rate
in period t and this rules out any exchange rate dynamics.
To describe the behaviour of the current account to money shocks take the period t national
budget constraint (9) and I iterate forward. Applying a no-ponzi game condition yields the
national intertemporal budget constraint,
10If C∗ ' yf,w h e r eyf is foreign income, then g∗ (= n∗yf) approximates foreign demand.
11The derivation of this result uses the real UIP condition, rt/r∗
t = qt+1/qt, the real consumption Euler
equation and the assumption β = β
∗.







tst − PtCt (1 − n)),( 1 7 )
where B−1 is the initial bond stock and i0i1.....it−1 ≡ 1 when t =0 . Setting the initial level of
debt equal to zero, noting it =1 /βµ ∀t, using the nominal consumption Euler equation (12),
the nominal UIP condition (6) and accounting for the initial conditions as st =( 1 /µ)
t s0,a n d
PtCt =( 1 /µ)
t P0C0 Ir e w r i t e( 1 7 )a s ,
0=βµ(P0C0 (n − 1) + g




t+1 = β/(1 − β). Equation (18) itself implies that the initial level of the
nominal exchange rate is s0 = P0C0(1 − n)/g∗ and that the real versiono ft h i sc o n d i t i o nb y
(5) is q0 = C0(1−n)/g∗. This holds for all periods and by substitution into the goods market
condition (15) a zero current account condition holds.
Remark 2 A zero current account holds in all periods (zero trade balance), Ph,tyh,t = PtCt
∀t.
If the interest rate is constant and at the steady state in all periods and in the initial period
the bond stock is assumed to be zero, in all future periods the bond stock will remain at zero.
Thus a zero current account in the initial period implies a zero current account in all periods,
and following a money shock the economy does not run a current account imbalance. The
real side of the economy is in a steady state in periods t ≥ 1 because of the type of rigidity
assumed and therefore yh,t = yh ∀t ≥ 1, where an upper-bar denotes the natural rate. Given
there is a zero current account in these periods there is an explicit solution for the natural
rate of output which can be derived by again appealing to the good-supply system.
Remark 3 The natural rate of output is below the competitive level and depends on prefer-
ences and technology, yh =( ( σ − 1)/σαη)
1/κα . It does not depend on the openness parameter,
n.
10T h el a b o u rm a r k e tb e c o m e sm o r ec o m p e t i t i v ea sσ →∞(yh → (1/αη)
1/κα ≡ y
pc
h ) and thus it
might appear that the presence of monopolistic competition gives the monetary authority an
incentive to increase output by making a larger than expected money transfer. Importantly
though households have access to two goods (domestic and foreign) so it does not necessarily
follow that the perfect competition and social planners’ outcomes are the same. The social





























Equation (19) is the utility function without the real money balances term and with the
consumption sub-index replacing C, (19a) is the production function, (19b) is the resource
constraint, (19c) represents a balanced trade condition and (19d) is the export demand func-
tion. From (19c) and (19d) for any arbitrarily given value of g∗ and Cf the only possible
solutions for τ and C∗
h are for them both to equal zero. Relaxing the assumption that Cf
is given Cf = g∗, but in this case (19c) and (19d) no longer uniquely determine τt and C∗
h
as functions of g∗ and Cf. Proceeding with the idea that Cf is pegged to g∗ it is possible
to substitute foreign goods consumption, Cf, directly into the utility function and drop the
ﬁnal constraint (19d). By imposing C∗
h = τ =0the problem is reduced still further by the
elimination of (19c) and then C∗
h from the resource constraint. Substituting the remaining
















where the ﬁrst order condition is,
11n/Ch − ηαC
ακ−1
h =0 . (21)
Re-substituting the transformed resource constraint into the ﬁrst order condition gives the
desired result.
Remark 4 The solution to the social planners’ problem depends on exogenous parameters
and in particular on the degree of openness, n. The social planners’ output level is given by,
e yh =( n/αη)
1/κα.
There are two comments which need to be made concerning this remark. First, although
τ =0is a special type of result which derives from the speciﬁc assumption made over consumer
preferences, there is an intuitive explanation. Foreign consumption of the domestic good (i.e.
exports) and the terms of trade do not aﬀect domestic utility, and so as negative values are
excluded, from the viewpoint of the social planner, their optimal values are zero . The fact
that it is feasible to drive these values to zero is a consequence of the particular unit-elastic
demand functions implied by the model. In this case, domestic labour goes entirely into
raising Ch as opposed to C∗
h, because only domestic consumption raises welfare. Under these
conditions the social planners outcome is a corner solution.
The second point turns out to be important when considering optimal monetary policy. In the
open economy, when the representative agent has a choice over two goods, the social planners
problem and the perfectly competitive market outcome diverge. In a closed economy these
values would be the same because taking n → 1 in the planners outcome or taking σ →∞
in the market outcome both imply yh =( 1 /αη)
1/κα. The reason for this divergence follows
similar lines to an optimal tariﬀ argument. If a country is large enough in world markets it
can impose a tariﬀ on imports to alter the terms of trade, which increases welfare. The tariﬀ
reduces the overall volume of trade in the world and generates production and consumption
costs, but by improving the terms of trade a moderate tariﬀ can produce beneﬁts that outweigh
these costs. In trade theory the small open economy assumptions usually imply that both
the domestic and foreign prices of goods are taken as given by the domestic economy, but
12the Mundell-Fleming assumptions employed here imply that the domestic economy has power
over the domestic price level because it exports a specialised output. In a decentralised
economy no individual private agent is able to aﬀect the terms of trade despite monopolistic
power over the wage rate, but the social planner does have this ability. The social planner
therefore eﬀectively coordinates the behaviour of all private agents to the detriment of the
foreign economy, increasing welfare by improving the terms of trade. This is why there is a
divergence between the planning and competitive outcomes.13
4 The Phillips Curve and Consumption-Output Rela-
tionship
To express the monetary authority’s problem it is ﬁrst necessary to derive constraints con-
sistent with an arbitrary policy choice. The constraints consist of a Phillips curve and a
consumption-output relationship. The Phillips curve is constructed by using the good-supply
system (15) and (14), and the zero trade balance condition. The Phillips curve is deﬁned in
terms of actual and expected real money balances instead of inﬂation, where expected real
money balances are me
t = Mt/P e
t . For households, choosing a value for me
t is equivalent to
choosing the inverse of the money wage, wt,w h i c hi sﬁxed in period t, as expected real bal-
ances are simply the expected price level normalised by the beginning of period (and therefore
predetermined) nominal money supply. Deciding on wt requires a forecast of the CPI and so
in this model mt and me
t play the role actual and expected inﬂation would do in an ad-hoc
model.
Proﬁt maximising ﬁrms make supply decisions based on the nominal wage deﬂated by the
domestic price level. Using the deﬁnitions of the price index and terms of trade there is an
alternative supply relation that depends on the CPI level and the terms of trade explicitly,14
13Although the optimal tariﬀ argument may seem a little strange in this context it is an application of a
beggar-thy-neighbour argument, such as also stressed in the recent analysis of Tille (2001).









.( 2 2 )
The ﬁrst stage in deriving the Phillips curve is to introduce expectations in (22). In the
current period wages are set so the expected real wage is a function of the expected price
level. It is straightforward to show that the current period output level is related to the
actual price level, the expectation of the price level and the natural rate of output, and as
actual and expected prices can be normalised by the beginning of period t level of nominal
money, the diﬀerence between the actual and expected level of real money balances determines
the diﬀerence between the current level of output and the natural rate. The goods equation
(15) and the zero trade balance condition relate the terms of trade to the level of output, and
ﬁnally to the labour input using the production function. Using this it is possible to derive




1/(n−α) yh.( 2 3 )
For any incorrect forecast of real balances (i.e. mt 6= me
t)t h ed i ﬀerence between current output
and it’s natural rate changes as the degree of openness changes. Therefore as openness changes
the trade-oﬀ the monetary authority faces when setting optimal policy also changes. Lower
n, which is an increase in the degree of openness, reduces 1/(n − α) in absolute value (recall
n − α<0) and thus a given reduction in mt has a smaller eﬀect on domestic output. This
type of relationship is stressed in previous studies because the terms of trade are really what
aﬀect the slope of the Phillips curve. When expectations are correct the current level of
output equals it’s natural rate level and this makes clear how a change in monetary policy can
increase output. Agents expect the full output level to prevail in each period, or rather that
mt = me
t and if the monetary authority increases the transfer, mt <m e
t for the period wages
are ﬁxed then yh,t > yh.O n e i m p o r t a n t d i ﬀerence to note is that because period t nominal
money holdings are predetermined when thinking about a monetary expansion in period t it
14does not mean that Mt has increased, rather that Mt+1 has increased and this produces the
increase in Pt. This explains why surprise inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt unambiguously reduces current
real money balances.
The second constraint links current consumption and domestic output. In a closed economy
consumption equals output when markets clear but here the zero trade balance condition
implies Ph,tyh,t = PtCt,w h e r ePh,t and Pt are endogenous. The relationship between these
two variables is a transformation of the terms of trade, but the terms of trade are uniquely
related, via the good-supply equations, to the level of output. Thus,




h,t.( 2 4 )
Taking the limit of (24) as n → 1,t h e nCt → yh,t, as in the closed economy. Both (23)
and (24) together determine the second constraint the monetary authority takes into account
when setting policy. The interesting feature of this second constraint is that it contains
both the openness parameter and the foreign demand measure. Re-expressing (24) as τt =
((1 − n)/g∗)yh,t the terms of trade must deteriorate when there is a money shock and as
this relationship depends on openness and foreign demand the ratio ((1 − n)/g∗) determines
whether monetary shocks aﬀect output with less of greater force.15
5O p t i m a l P o l i c y
The focus of this section is on the optimal policy choice when the monetary authority and
households play a one shot game.16 Under this assumption the monetary authority’s choice
over money growth is equivalent to a choice over real balances. A sketch of this argument




16The outcome of such a game is commonly referred to as a Markov equilibrium.
15pendix.17 T h ek e yr e s u l t se x a m i n e dh e r ea r e ;h o wt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation varies with (i) the
degree of competition in the labour market, (ii) foreign demand, (iii) openness and (iv) how
the openness-inﬂation relationship is itself dependent on foreign demand.
5.1 The Monetary Authority’s Problem
The monetary authority maximises utility subject to three constraints; the Phillips curve,
(23), the consumption-output relationship (24), and as with the social planner, the production
constraint, (7). In full (dropping t subscripts),
max
m U =l n C + aνm













with me given. From inspection the monetary authority’s problem is very similar to the social
planners’ problem, except the constraints (25b) and (25c) are the result of private optimising
behaviour, and the monetary authority chooses real money balances, not consumption and
labour supply.18 The solution to this problem describes a reaction function, which makes real
balances an implicit function of expected real balances, and writing this out with real money




(ν−1)/ν +( αηe y
κα





h /(n − α))
(α−n)/κα . (26)
17An extended discussion of this idea is also provided by Ireland (1997).
18It is worth noting at this point that much of the recent literature on optimal policy exploits a second-order
approximation to the utility function which assumes the welfare from liquidity services is negligible, see for
example Woodford (2003) ch.6. This approach is also given as a justiﬁcation for assuming something similar
to an ad-hoc loss function.
16Equation (26) also makes use of the deﬁnitions of the natural rate of output and the social
planners’ output level. Solving for equilibrium real balances requires the private agents
reaction function which is given by the long-run Phillips curve. Thus to obtain the equilibrium
level of real balances I set m = me = m∗, which gives,
m




h )/a(α − n))
ν/(ν−1) . (27)
This solution raises a signiﬁcant point, because if the natural rate of output exceeds the
optimal level, then the level of real money balances that obtains in equilibrium is undeﬁned.
In terms of the parameters of the model the condition e yh > yh,r e q u i r e df o raw e l ld e ﬁned
equilibrium, can be equivalently expressed as n>(σ − 1)/σ ≡ δ and because the social
planners’ output level is determined from the structural relationships of the model it cannot
be guaranteed this condition holds. In a closed economy, n → 1 implies e yh → (1/αη)
1/κα,
such that the socially optimal level of output is always greater than the monopolistic natural
rate, and the level of equilibrium real balances is always positive. To further understand
why there is the possibility an undeﬁned level of real balances it is possible to depict the
optimisation problem for the monetary authority in (m,yh) space. From (23) the slope of
the Phillips curve is negative because α>n . Rearranging the utility function, imposing the
consumption-output relation and holding utility constant shows the slope of the indiﬀerence
curves depend on the level of output,
∂m/∂yh = −m
1/v (n − αηy
κα
h )/ayh. (28)































Figure One: Monetary Authority’s Optimization Problem
The short-run Phillips curve only allows for tangency points on the negatively sloped portion
of the monetary authority’s indiﬀerence curves, where the natural rate of output is below the
social optimum. A natural rate of output above the social optimum will not characterise a
feasible equilibrium, something clearly shown by (28) because if δ = n,t h e n∂m/∂yh =0 .
The ﬁnal step in solving for optimal inﬂation is to equate equilibrium real balances with steady
state real balances. In the steady state real balances are stationary so mt = m ∀t and inﬂation





where π denotes gross inﬂation and by substituting in (27) the discretionary rate of inﬂation,
denoted π∗, can be written in the compact form,
π






Inﬂation is now clearly split between the Friedman rule level of inﬂa t i o na n dt h eb i a st e r m .
18The Friedman level of inﬂation in this economy is simply π∗ = β and is the outcome when
the monetary authority has access to a commitment technology. The basic intuition for
this result is that there is a wedge generated between the private and social marginal cost of
holding money and when i>1 this generates an ineﬃciency. If there were no opportunity
cost to holding money this ineﬃciency would disappear, but this requires that inﬂation equal
the inverse of the real interest rate, which is given by β. The bias term is decreasing in
real balances and increasing in consumption. The ﬁrst part representing the consumption-
output relationship (24) is such that the bias contains both the openness and foreign demand
parameters. The second term is the equilibrium level of real balances, given by (27). The
bias component split is important because, as I will argue, the real balances part captures the
essence of the ad-hoc approach, whilst consumption, which overturns many of the results in
the older literature, appears from the use of micro-foundations.
5.2 Inﬂation
In this section I examine how the distortion in the labour market, the degree of openness and
foreign demand alter the equilibrium rate of inﬂation. The analysis focuses on the case where
e yh exceeds yh. Rewriting (29) in terms of exogenous parameters alone using (24) and (27),
π
∗ = β + aβ(δ/ηα)










T a k i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v eo f( 3 0 )w i t hr e s p e c tt oδ ∈ [0,n] shows that there are two competing
eﬀects from the distortion on the level of inﬂation,
∂π
∗/∂δ =( π
∗ − β)((n/ακδ) − (1/(n − δ)(1 − ν))). (31)
When the monopolistic distortion is high a reduction in the distortion (i.e. a higher δ) raises
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation as the marginal cost of inﬂation in utility terms falls, via a leisure eﬀect, and
the term n/ακδ dominates the right hand side of equation (31). As the distortion continues
to rise there is a second eﬀect through real money balances and the term 1/(n − δ)(1 − ν)
19dominates. Higher distortion levels imply lower equilibrium demand for real balances so
that for a given rate of inﬂation an increase in the distortion lowers holdings of real balances.
As holdings of real balances lower, the associated cost of inﬂation is higher and thus the
monetary authority will alter it’s policy to reﬂect this additional cost. As the elasticity of
labour demand continues to rise (δ → n) inﬂation continues to fall and so these two eﬀects
give rise to a non-monotonicity result stressed in Neiss (1999). Only in a closed economy
w i l lt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation approach the Friedman rule as the labour market becomes more
competitive. In this case, the leisure eﬀect is simply a consumption eﬀect as C = yh = l1/α.
Hence the consumption term is what really overturns the monotonic relation in Barro and
Gordon (1983).
A second result of interest concerns the impact of foreign demand on domestic inﬂation. It
is clear from inspecting (30) that as n ∈ [0,1] when foreign demand for domestic production
increases, so does domestic inﬂation. Recalling that foreign demand appears in the domestic
goods market condition (15) then the positive relation with foreign demand has some intu-
itive appeal. A rise in foreign demand improves the equilibrium terms of trade, implying a
one unit increase in output produces a bigger increase in consumption via (24), and thus a
larger increase in utility. The temptation to inﬂate is therefore greater and this increases
the equilibrium inﬂation bias. What is perhaps more signiﬁcant is that foreign demand is
exogenous from the viewpoint of the monetary authority. Thus, although it is popular to
construct arguments that it is possible to reduce the inﬂation bias via institutional arrange-
ments, once there is an exogenous increase in foreign demand the rate of domestic inﬂation
will rise, exacerbating any bias problems already present in the economy.
The major question to address is whether or not the model predicts an inverse relationship
between openness and inﬂation. The measure of openness is given by n, but inspecting (30)
it is clear that n’s relationship with inﬂation is potentially ambiguous. One reason for this
is that it is not simply the Phillips curve that alters as openness changes. Remark four in
section three demonstrates that the optimal level of output changes as openness changes, and
this is associated with the set of indiﬀerence curves, not the Phillips curve. A signiﬁcant
20preliminary comment is that the relationship between openness and equilibrium real balances
is unambiguous. Taking the derivative of (27) with respect to n,
∂m
∗/∂n = ν(α − δ)m
∗/(ν − 1)(α − n)(n − δ). (32)
As n>δ ,a n dν<1, (32) is negative. To demonstrate how this relates to inﬂation, ﬁrst
recall from (29), that holding consumption constant, ∂π∗/∂m∗ < 0. Given this relationship
the eﬀect of openness via real balances alone is positive and accounting for the level of real
balances alone in (29) a more open economy has a lower rate of inﬂation. Thus the real
balance eﬀect and the relationship between openness and inﬂa t i o ni np r e v i o u ss t u d i e ss u c ha s
Rogoﬀ (1985) and Romer (1993) is analogous to the real balance eﬀect and the relationship
between the distortion and inﬂation in Barro and Gordon (1983), because in both cases the real
balances term serves to capture the main message in the ad-hoc literature. To fully describe
the reaction of inﬂation to changes in openness it is necessary to again consider changes in
steady-state consumption. Taking the two parts of consumption separately, see again (30),
(δ/ηα)
n/κα is decreasing in n because δ/ηα ≡ yh < 1, and this counteracts the eﬀect of
real balances. The term ((1 − n)/g∗)
n−1 increases or decreases with openness depending on
foreign demand, g∗. The magnitude of foreign demand therefore determines an important
component of the relationship between openness and inﬂation, as this parameter cannot be
pinned down. Before thinking about this in more detail it is useful to plot the inﬂation-
openness-distortion relationship by assuming reasonable parameter values; below β =0 .96,
ν =0 .1,α=2 ,a=1 ,η=2 ,κ=2 . I set g∗ =1 0 0and g∗ =1 /100.
21Figure Two: Openness and Inﬂation when g∗ =1 0 0and g∗ =1 /100
As n ∈ [0,1] rises the economy is more closed and as δ ∈ [0,n] rises the labour market is more
competitive, so when δ = n =1 , the Friedman rule is optimal and π =0 .96.19 From the plots
the previous results become clearer. In the space where n>δar e a lb a l a n c ee ﬀect operates as
the distortion changes. When n =1 , as the distortion rises, inﬂation rises due to the leisure
eﬀect but eventually falls due to the real balance eﬀect. As the domestic economy is more
open the relative strength of the real balance eﬀect increases. From the diagram a reduction
in n lowers the optimal level of output and therefore only when n =1 , is the leisure eﬀect at
‘full’ strength. Conversely when n → 0 there is no leisure eﬀect as a higher distortion cannot
induce the level of output to fall without entering the region where inﬂation is not deﬁned.
For every point in the plot where g∗ =1 0 0 ,i n ﬂation is higher, except when the economy is
closed, as then the curves coincide.
The plots also show that for low levels of foreign demand the relationship between openness
and inﬂation is unambiguously negative. The ﬁrst thing to recall is that higher foreign
demand improves the equilibrium terms of trade so that when foreign demand is low the
terms of trade are relatively unfavourable. In this case the eﬀect of real balances gives the
19Or rather that the steady state interest rate is 4.2%.
22standard result; inﬂation rises as the economy becomes more closed. When foreign demand
is ‘high’ and the terms of trade are improved the real balances eﬀe c ti so n l yd o m i n a n tw h e n
the economy is relatively open; as the economy becomes closed it is possible that inﬂation
falls. Examining steady state consumption more closely it becomes clear why the key to the
ambiguity between openness and inﬂation is the level of foreign demand. Consider the function
f(n,g∗) ≡ ((1 − n)/g∗)
n−1, which determines the relative price of domestic consumption to
domestic output, C/yn
h. An obvious point of note is the behaviour of the function as n reaches
extreme values; f(1,g∗)=1and f(0,g∗)=g∗, so when the economy is closed and market
clearing implies C = yh, foreign demand plays no role in determining inﬂation.20 As before
with an improved terms of trade there is a greater incentive to inﬂate, but when the economy
is closed this incentive disappears. The incentive is magniﬁed in a more open economy and
therefore if foreign demand is very high, as the economy becomes closed, inﬂation will fall
because once the economy is closed any level of foreign demand is consistent with the same
level of inﬂa t i o n . T h e r e f o r ei ti sp o s s i b l et h a ti n ﬂation will fall as the economy becomes
more closed because this second eﬀect changes the equilibrium terms of trade, which alters
the incentives of the monetary authority.
It is possible to draw some interesting points from the analysis. Even in this stylised model
i td o e sn o ta l w a y sa p p e a rt ob et r u et h a ta ni n v e r s er e l a t i o n s h i ph o l d s . A c c o u n t i n gf o rr e a l
balances alone gives the standard result, but once changes in the steady state consumption
are allowed for, it is possible to overturn this. Changing the level of foreign demand alters the
openness-inﬂation relationship because of a second eﬀect from the equilibrium terms of trade
which operates through the monetary authority’s utility function. In the case when foreign
demand is ‘low’ for the parameter space where inﬂation is deﬁned the inverse relationship
between openness and inﬂation holds. Increasing foreign demand the results are overturned,
where as initially the economy becomes more closed the rate of domestic inﬂation rises, after a
certain point it begins to fall. This suggests that the small open economy openness-inﬂation
relationship is more dependent on f o r e i g nd e m a n dt h a ni tm i g h ta tﬁrst seem. An ad-hoc
20Note fn(n,g∗)=0when g∗ =( 1− n)exp.
23model, by not accounting for the role of consumption (or rather only accounting for the real
balances part of equilibrium inﬂation), misses a major part of the openness-inﬂation story.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model based on a set of small open economy
assumptions to analyse the inﬂation bias. I test the idea that in a more open economy the
rate of inﬂation is lower and ﬁnd openness alters inﬂation via two mechanisms. First, there
is the eﬀect of the Phillips curve; when a country is more open the slope of the Phillips curve
is steeper, increasing the inﬂation cost and reducing the output gain from surprise inﬂation.
There is also a second eﬀect in the model because the socially optimal level of output depends
on openness and this helps pin down the position of the monetary authority’s set of indiﬀerence
curves. The results suggest that inﬂation is inversely related to openness when accounting
for real balances alone, but that for a full analysis of inﬂation it is necessary to account for
steady state consumption, and this depends on foreign demand. When foreign demand is low
the inverse relationship holds, but when foreign demand is suﬃciently high inﬂation rises and
falls with openness.
24A General Statement of the Monetary Authority’s Prob-
lem
Households make forecasts over all future money growth rates, µt,µ t+1,..before they observe








This function gives one step-ahead forecasts, but private agents need to forecast all future
µt+i’s to make current decisions and therefore it is necessary to ‘chain’ together all values of
µe









t+i i st h ef o r e c a s to fµt+i made at the beginning of period t. Given this forecasted
sequence the next step is to derive the value of mt the household will actually choose. To do
this plug each value for (A2) into the saddle path solution for (16), which makes current real
balances a function of the entire sequence of money growth rates. Denote this,
mt = ψ(µt−1,µ t−2,..µ 0). (A3)
This is the monetary authority’s forecasting constraint. The monetary authority also needs to
know what equilibrium real balances will be given any choice path for money growth. Using
(A3) in the Phillips curve (23), the consumption-output relation (24) and the period t version
of the diﬀerence equation (16) where mt+1 is set equal to me
t+1 (what matters in determining
m o n e yd e m a n di np e r i o dt is agents expectations about money demand in period t+1)g i v e s
a second constraint, denoted,
m
e
t = j(µt;ψ(µt−1,µ t−2,..µ 0),ψ(µt,µ t−1,..µ0)). (A4)
Call this the real balances constraint. Given these two constraints the full statement of the






























mt = ψ(µt−1,µ t−2,..µ 0)
m
e
t = j(µt;ψ(µt−1,µ t−2,..µ 0),ψ(µt,µ t−1,..µ 0)).
A rational expectations equilibrium exists when the forecasting constraint is consistent with
the real balances constraint.
There is a very simple relationship between this statement of the problem and (25) in the
main text. When there is no history dependence the household forecasts over the money
growth rate are not a set of functions but a sequence of values, µ0,µ 1,.. and likewise the
c o u n t e r p a r tt o( A 3 )a r et h ev a l u e sm0,m 1,... In this case each money growth rate only
aﬀects the corresponding level of real balances within the period and therefore the monetary
authority can equivalently maximise utility with respect to mt. The rational expectations
equilibrium obtains when mt = me
t ∀t and then the discretionary equilibrium is stationary.
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